Business Impact Analysis Based on Supply Chain's Knowledge Sharing ability  by Li, Xia & Hu, Jiao
 Procedia Environmental Sciences  12 ( 2012 )  1302 – 1307 
1878-0296 © 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of National University of Singapore.
doi: 10.1016/j.proenv.2012.01.425 
2011 International Conference on Environmental Science and Engineering 
(ICESE 2011) 
Business Impact Analysis Based on Supply Chain’s 
Knowledge Sharing ability 
Xia Lia,JIAO HUb*
a School of Management, Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an, Shanxi, China  
b School of Management, Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an, Shanxi, China  
Abstract 
Supply Chain is not the material chain, but also knowledge of the supply chain on  21st Century.The article outlines 
the significance of supply chain knowledge sharing.By the Prisoner's Dilemma Model of  game theory,the article 
analyses the affectial relationship between knowledge sharing among enterprises and corporate earnings in the supply 
chain. The article came to the conclusion that knowledge sharing among enterprises would help the whole supply 
chain to maximize total revenue and improve supply chain efficiency and knowledge sharing success rate. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional supply chain management mainly due to resolve the uncertainty caused by fluctuations in 
demand .It can improve the response speed of the market, meet customer demand, shorten delivery time, 
reduce costs. With the expansion of the organization and the changing intense of the competitive 
environment, the competitive advantage of supply chain is not limited to the joint sum of the enterprise 
tangible assets. Knowledge of supply chain has become a decisive factor about the development of the 
supply chain. In the modern knowledge society, ability of the enterprise knowledge sharing has become a 
key element to determine the competitiveness of the supply chain. 
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Today’s supply Chain is not the material chain, but also knowledge of the supply chain. Parties of 
supply chain during the collaborative process, not only spreads knowledge of the supply chain, but also 
absorbs the knowledge of other enterprises from the supply chain in order to achieve the knowledge 
resources’ complementary. Though effective knowledge sharing of supply chain, to joint to the valuable 
knowledge resources of the various enterprise, and to let the knowledge in the supply chain flowing. Then 
enhance the breadth and depth of knowledge sharing. 
All aspects of the organization or business such as suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and consumers 
all have supply chain knowledge. Supply chain knowledge sharing is based on mutual trust between 
enterprises in the supply chain. Supply chain member companies have highly complementary business and 
knowledge heterogeneity. Through knowledge sharing among each other they can integrate knowledge 
resources, accelerate the speed of knowledge and innovation, and improve the efficiency of knowledge 
innovation. These positive effects of knowledge sharing will eventually be reflected in the supply chain 
impaction on members of the business. Thus there is a causal relationship between knowledge sharing and 
business performance throughout the supply chain. So it is important to promote and strengthen inter-
enterprise supply chain knowledge sharing. This paper uses game theory's "prisoner's dilemma" model and 
analyses business impaction on knowledge sharing throughout the supply chain. 
2. The significance of supply chain knowledge sharing 
2.1. Increase the stock of knowledge supply chain, improve the use value of knowledge 
Under the guidance of the knowledge in supply chain management system, independent knowledge 
resources of the business are organically organized to form a complete chain of knowledge resources 
network. The exchange within enterprises through the supply chain knowledge can achieve the knowledge 
sharing of the supply chain. On individual enterprises, it can broad the field of knowledge, and indirectly 
achieve the increase the stock of knowledge. On the supply chain, it can reduce the total investment in 
knowledge assets, promote knowledge assets to optimization within the entire supply chain, speed up the 
knowledge flow of supply chain, increase the stock of knowledge in the supply chain, expand the 
knowledge flow, maximally activate the knowledge on the chain, and improve knowledge of the use value. 
2.2. Reduce the cost of the accessing knowledge, improve the performance of knowledge assets 
The things that consistency of supply chain objectives, complementary of businesses and the 
heterogeneity of knowledge has prepared good conditions for Supply chain knowledge sharing. In the 
current supply chain knowledge sharing is a very important and effective source of business external 
knowledge and technological innovation source. Supply chain knowledge chain reserves a wealth of 
knowledge resources. It meets the needs of the enterprise knowledge sharing on supply chain, reduces the 
costs of the supply chain business knowledge acquisition and communication, achieves the scientific of 
supply chain management decision-making, and improves operations of overall supply chain’s efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
2.3. Improve organizational forms, accelerate the speed of innovation and application of knowledge 
Under the guidance of ideas about supply chain knowledge sharing, organization of the supply chain is 
no longer a simple interface and overlay of the simple business processes. But in accordance with the 
requirements of the systematic, dynamic and holistic, it is to transform the irrational aspects of the process 
and improve flexibility and agility of supply chain knowledge-based on the integration and restructuring of 
supply chain. It has speeded up the pace of knowledge innovation of the supply chain and the application 
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speed of new knowledge. In addition, it can improve the ability of the knowledge innovation of the supply 
chain, and enhance supply chain's ability to adapt to the external environment. 
2.4. Optimize the allocation of resources, reduce business risk 
The development and use of knowledge resources on the supply chain have optimized the supply chain 
management, played the company's own advantage, came an effect in a wider range of resources. 
3. Based on supply chain knowledge sharing model and analysis 
3.1. Static game model about knowledge sharing 
Supply chain typically includes suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers and end users of the five 
components. This paper uses the "prisoner's dilemma" game model. First the article analysis the proceeds’ 
issue caused by knowledge sharing between the two partners. Then it determines whether a company to 
share knowledge, and then the game can be extended to the whole partners on the supply chain. It selects 
the two important members such as manufacturers and suppliers on supply chain to illustrate the problem. 
The article assumes that the both parts of the game are manufacturers and suppliers, and they have their 
own knowledge. There are two alternative strategies when manufacturers and suppliers thinking with their 
own interests. These two strategies are shared and not shared. If both sides choose to share strategies, then 
each party is to benefit R
*
. If both parties choose not to share strategies, then the income of each party is 
zero. If one of the parties chooses to share, while the other one chooses not to share, then the party which 
chooses not to share will gain excess profits R ,and the party which chooses to share will be the worst 
earnings R . The payoff matrix of Manufacturers and suppliers has been shown below. (Show in table I.) 
Tab.1 Reliability test 
Manufacturers 
Table Column Head 
Suppliers 
Share Not Share 
Share R R R R
 Not Share R R 0 0
The model requires both of the following conditions: 
RRR !!! 0*                                                                                                                                 (1) 
RRR !*2 (2)
It can be found that suppliers will not share the strategies regardless of the manufacturer to share or not 
share the policy strategy. At this point we can say that not sharing strategy is the dominant strategy for 
supplier. To the same reason, not share strategy is the dominant strategy for manufacturers. It means that 
(not shared, not shared) is the result of the game's Nash equilibrium. As R >
*R andˮζ0,for any business 
which participates in knowledge sharing, No matter how the other options, not share strategy is all their 
best strategy. Because both are based on the idea, knowledge-sharing cooperation will ultimately not be 
successful. However, our analysis can be seen that both will receive the proceeds if the both sides choose 
to share˄ *R ˈ *R ˅.This total revenue is much better than that the two sides do not share. Therefore, 
there is the worst game of strategy that the parties choose not to share. 
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3.2. Knowledge-sharing of static game model 
The "prisoner's dilemma" model reflects one-time knowledge sharing of the manufacturer and supplier. 
It is a conflict of a single supply chain business interest and supply chain business interests. There are the 
following aspects of the failure to share. 
 Firstly, low trust and poor communication. If both parts selected cooperation strategic, the unilateral 
could access to the normal income and both parts could achieve the overall benefits˄ RRR !
*2 ˅.
But everyone suspects that the other will choose non-cooperation. They are afraid that they own may be the 
worst of their income. Therefore, the lack of both trust and communication is the main reason for the 
failure of knowledge sharing about the game sides. 
 Secondly, hort-sighted. Each subject in the game will choose the most advantageous strategy in the 
knowledge sharing process. ecause of
*RR ! , the best result is that they have the largest income in the 
game. But this short-sighted may let each other to lose the opportunity in their long-term cooperation in a 
moment. Eventually they lead to the failure of knowledge sharing. 
Thirdly, lack of incentive .As the game results of 0R , so each game party will consider something if 
the other party chooses not to share. If the other party chooses not to share but he chose to share, he will be 
worth in knowledge sharing and his interests will be lost. Therefore, both will choose not to share. It also 
leads to the failure of knowledge sharing. 
3.3. Effective measures for promoting knowledge sharing in supply chain 
In order to strengthen the supply chain knowledge sharing among enterprises, we can take the following 
effective measures to promote inter-firm knowledge-sharing behavior. 
Firstly, improve trust between supply chain. We can create a conducive atmosphere for the exchange, so 
that prove communication between enterprises, and strengthen mutual understanding and communication, 
thereby enhancing mutual trust between enterprises. 
Secondly, overcome the company's short-sighted behavior. In the other conditions remain unchanged, 
the supply chain co-operation between enterprises can not be one-off transactions. To maintain the stability 
of cooperation can maintain the supply chain’s long-term gains. Therefore, enterprises should avoid short-
sighted, and ultimately form the long-term partner to improve service quality and reduce costs. 
Thirdly, strengthen the incentive of enterprises. We can increase the total income in the supply chain in 
order to promote knowledge sharing among the various enterprises. By improving the sharing of power 
between enterprises, we can maximize the firm's total revenue in the supply chain. 
Although these channels can promote the supply chain of knowledge sharing, but they increased the 
company's operating costs and management costs. So we need more effective ways to strengthen inter-firm 
knowledge sharing. In game theory, the factors that affecting the results of the game is mainly the game's 
integrity and knowledge of the number of times. If the process between the businesses in the game can 
have the infinite repetitions, the company will consider the full of supply chain in the whole process of the 
game, thus affecting the final outcome of the game. 
4. The Dynamic Repeated  Game Model Of Knowledge Sharing In Supply Chain 
In order to better supply chain development, the members will generally consider that how to effectively 
balance the interests of current and future interests in the long-term cooperative relationship in the 
knowledge sharing process. Members of the supply chain can not predict when the last game of knowledge 
sharing will occur. Therefore, the introduction of infinitely repeated games is necessary. The ways can 
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solve the status quo of the "Prisoner's Dilemma”. In the course of repeated games, cooperation between 
enterprises of every game can be seen as a one-time game. The both of the enterprises in repeat game are 
constant. The pre-game result will affect the post-game process. At this point, you can use a factor “a” to 
represent a probability of repeated game in the course of repeated games. The value of “a” depends on the 
satisfaction of the last game. So the value of “a” will be greater if the satisfaction is higher. Then the 
chance of sharing knowledge will be greater. (a=0 means the game is One-off game. a=1 means the game 
is permanent game). The cooperation between members of the supply chain is between the one-off game 
and the unlimited repeatability game. So the value of “a” is between 0 and 1. For businesses, as long as the 
permanent benefits of knowledge sharing are greater than the one-time short-sighted gains, knowledge 
sharing is the best choice. 
According to the Prisoner's Dilemma, as long as each member of the supply chain companies has 
chosen to share knowledge, we could get the most benefit. But the parties in the game are not sure whether 
the other parties will take the knowledge sharing strategy. At this point we can assume that in the first 
game the probalility of that one party selectes knowledge-sharing strategy is P. Then the P can represent a 
line of credit.  And P will be greater if the line of credit between the two parties is higher. The chance of 
the sharing knowledge will be larger. The benefits of the whole supply chain will be greater. 
Assumed the expectations is E if the two sides choose the sharing of knowledge, and the expectations is 
E  if they don’t choose it. To the both companies in the Knowledge sharing in the supply chain, in the first 
round of the game, it can be calculated as follows: 
RPaPRE )1()1/(*  (3)
RPE  (4) 
The desired net income about selecting the knowledge-sharing:   
])1/([*' * RRaRPRE  (5) 
The minimum amount of trust between the two sides in knowledge sharing: 
)]1/(/[min * aRRRRP  (6)
When knowledge-sharing trust of both sides is greater than the minimum confidence, the repeated game 
can generate cooperative. If one party uses the other's knowledge-sharing and accesses to excess profits, it 
will reduce the credit limit, while increasing the other's credit limit. So the amount of trust in collaboration 
is changing with the increase in the number. Repeated down, when one's trust in the amount of P is less 
than the minimum credit limit, other companies in the supply chain will terminate their knowledge sharing. 
When one party’s line of credit in knowledge sharing is greater than P, other businesses will think that the 
company can be trusted, and will take the initiative to share their knowledge. At this point we can see that 
credit is so important for business. Continued cooperation and knowledge sharing can help communication, 
communication, mutual improve access to long-term gains at the same time between supply chain 
businesses.
5. Conclusion 
This article outlines the significance of the modern supply chain in knowledge sharing. By the game 
model we have analyzed the impact of various corporate earnings in the supply chain from knowledge 
sharing. By the repeated game model we obtained that it can promote all businesses in the supply chain to 
maximize long-term revenue and improve operational efficiency throughout the supply chain by repeating 
knowledge sharing between supply chain members. 
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